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The Explanatory Role of Computation in Cognitive Science∗ 
Abstract. This paper deals with the question: which notion of computation (if any) is 
essential for explaining cognition? Five answers are discussed in the paper. 
1. The classicist answer: symbolic (digital) computation is required for explaining 
cognition. 
2. The broad digital computationalist answer: digital computation broadly construed is 
required for explaining cognition. 
3. The connectionist answer: sub-symbolic computation is required for explaining 
cognition. 
4. The computational neuroscientist answer: neural computation (that, strictly, is neither 
digital nor analogue) is required for explaining cognition. 
5. The extreme dynamicist answer: computation is not required for explaining cognition. 
The first four answers are only accurate to a first approximation. But the “devil” is in the 
details. The last answer cashes in on the parenthetical “if any” in the question above. The 
classicist argues that cognition is symbolic computation. But digital computationalism need 
not be equated with classicism. Indeed, computationalism can, in principle, range from digital 
(and analogue) computationalism through (the weaker thesis of) generic computationalism to 
(the even weaker thesis of) digital (or analogue) pancomputationalism. Connectionism, which 
has traditionally been criticised by classicists for being non-computational, can be plausibly 
construed as being either analogue or digital computationalism (depending on the type of 
connectionist networks used). Computational neuroscience invokes the notion of neural 
computation that may (possibly) be interpreted as a sui generis type of computation. The 
extreme dynamicist argues that the time has come for a post-computational cognitive science. 
This paper is an attempt to shed some light on this debate by examining various conceptions 
and misconceptions of (particularly digital) computation. 
1 Introduction 
There is currently considerable confusion and disarray about just how we should view 
computationalism, connectionism and dynamicism as explanatory frameworks in cognitive 
science. In this paper, I endeavour to shed some light on the degree to which they are in 
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conflict versus their degree of overlap, on whether they are explanatory or merely descriptive, 
on which levels of analysis they belong to and on their explanatory posits. Since, by and 
large, this task is conceptually laden, it is taken primarily from a philosophical point of view. 
An important distinction that should be drawn in this context is between the conceptual issue 
of how computation is best characterised and the empirical issue of how cognition is best 
explained.  
On the one hand, as regards the empirical issue, classicism, connectionism and 
dynamicism are not in competition. A single system might be correctly modelled within each 
one of these paradigms. It is also even possible that all of them include some form of 
computation simpliciter (insofar as dynamicists are willing to accept it as being explanatorily 
relevant). So, in this sense, the three paradigms may explanatorily coexist, if within each 
paradigm the same system is modelled in different ways. Still, this implies that within 
dynamicism models of the cognitive phenomena in question are also made available. 
On the other hand, viewed from a different perspective, they are in conflict. Either the 
bulk of cognitive phenomena are best explained symbolically or they are not. And if they are 
best explained symbolically, then a particular form of (digital) computation will indeed be 
central. This was the crux of the classicist-connectionist debate in the late 80’s and 
throughout the 90’s. Further, either the bulk of cognitive phenomena are best explained in a 
disembodied/non-embedded manner or they are not. Here enters the extreme dynamicist to 
the debate denouncing the computationalist and connectionist explanatory efforts. 
Moreover, the concept of computation is ill-understood and it is the source of an ongoing 
conflict among the central paradigms in cognitive science. This conflict stems from an 
equivocation on the notion of computation simpliciter. Computation is invoked differently by 
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broad digital computationalism, connectionism and computational neuroscience with varying 
degrees of success. It is not just the dichotomy between analogue and digital computation that 
is the basis for this equivocation, but also the diversity of extant interpretations of digital 
computation. Analogue computation has received even less attention in the literature, and 
much like its digital counterpart, it remains equivocal. Some observations are also made in 
the paper regarding how the precise characterisation of ‘analogue computation’ varies among 
different authors. Still, my focus here is on concrete digital computation (i.e., as it is 
actualised in physical computing systems). 
Two main arguments are presented throughout this paper. First, a blanket dismissal of the 
key role computation plays in cognitive science is unwarranted. For ‘computation’ is an 
ambiguous concept and is invoked differently across a range of research programs in 
cognitive science. And whilst some accounts of concrete digital computation proper are 
untenable, others remain plausible and have important implications for the explanatory 
paradigms that are underpinned by them. 
Second, the idea that computationalism, connectionism and dynamicism are mutually 
exclusive is wrong. For computationalism can be narrowly construed as classicism, but also 
more broadly as digital computationalism, generic computationalism or even 
pancomputationalism (and also as analogue computationalism). Further, connectionism is 
compatible with generic computationalism, since it may be classified as either digital or 
analogue computationalism, depending on the type of neural nets used. Digital 
computationalism and connectionism make available mechanistic models of the cognitive 
phenomena in question. But dynamicism proper is not on a par with either connectionism or 
digital computationalism, as it does not (necessarily) offer a mechanistic explanation. 
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The paper proceeds as follows in reply to the question of which notion of computation 
simpliciter is essential for explaining cognition. In Section 2, I make some observations 
concerning representations in cognitive science and the type of representations that plays a 
role in computing systems proper. Subsequently, in Section 3, the classicist stance is 
reviewed and then compared with broader versions of computationalism: digital 
computationalism, generic computationalism and pancomputationalism based on the chosen 
construal of computation. In Section 4, I show how (pace classicists) connectionism is an 
important variant of computationalism. Section 5 examines the role that computation plays in 
computational neuroscience. In Section 6, I explore the non-computational shift promoted by 
extreme dynamicists, who dismiss the key role computation should play in cognitive science. 
Section 7 addresses the mechanistic versus non-mechanistic debate and how 
computationalism, connectionism and dynamicism figure in that debate. 
2 Representations in Cognitive Science 
Since the following discussion revolves around representations as they figure in the 
philosophy of mind, but supposedly also in computation proper, a brief digression is required 
to briefly examine them. When the mind is viewed as being involved in coordinating the 
behavior of a cognitive agent in its environment, one plausible strategy is to view some of its 
internal states and processes as carrying information about or standing in for those relevant 
aspects of its body and external states of affairs in negotiating its environment (Bechtel 
1998a: p. 297). Mental representations function as Stand-Ins for objects or events outside the 
cognitive agent and once the agent obtains those representations, it can operate on them 
rather than needing the actual objects or events (Fodor 1980). 
Mental representations have two important features, namely being physically realisable 
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and being intentional. The first feature implies that they have causal powers. And being 
intentional, mental representations convey meaning or content. This characterisation 
presupposes a distinction between the vehicle (a physical state or structure, such as a string of 
symbols) and its content. The issue concerning the admissible vehicles of representation 
remains highly controversial (Egan 2011), yet it is common in computational cognitive 
science to assume that these vehicles are computational structures or states in the brain (von 
Eckardt 1993: pp. 168-169).  
Moreover, there are two main approaches in computational cognitive science to the 
interpretation of representational vehicles. According to classicism, complex data structures 
(formally construed) constitute the representational vehicles of our mental representations. 
According to connectionism, the representational vehicles are either local, in which case they 
are attributed to individual activated units, or distributed, in which case they are attributed to 
sets of activated units (von Eckardt 1993: pp. 169, 176). Whilst the main motivation for 
taking the classicist’s data structures to be the bearers of representational content is their 
compositionality-enabling structure, connectionist networks do not straightforwardly exhibit 
such structure. 
Also, an important distinction to be drawn regarding mental representations in this 
context is between processes operating on representations and representations figuring in 
processes (Bechtel 1998a: pp. 299-300). The ‘operating on representations’ alternative gives 
rise to the interpretation of representations as static data structures awaiting some operation to 
be performed on them. On the other hand, the ‘representation figuring in processes’ 
alternative allows for representations to change dynamically. The former alternative is the 
basis for the classicist thesis, where representations, which have a propositional format, are 
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operated on by explicit language-like rules. Still, arguably in connectionist networks 
distributed representations figure in activation-spreading processes and change dynamically. 
However, in the context of accounts of (digital) computation proper, a further distinction 
should be drawn between intrinsic and extrinsic representations. We should distinguish what 
computer scientists call formal semantics from real-world semantics invoked by philosophers 
(White 2011: p. 194). An intrinsic representation in a digital computing system is “confined” 
to the physical boundaries of that system (and has some formal semantics), whilst an extrinsic 
one (which has real-world semantics) is not. Internal symbols, for example, are intrinsic 
representations, whose referents are also internal to the computing system. So, both the 
representer (e.g., a symbol or a string) and the representee (e.g., a memory register or an 
instruction) reside within the physical boundaries of the computing system. Internal reference 
to symbols and expressions in conventional digital computers is assigned and it is a primitive 
in the computer’s architecture. Further, symbols in programming languages have formal 
semantics that is given by the semantics of those languages (ibid: p. 191).  
Any semantics of intrinsic representations is confined to the physical boundaries of the 
computer1. This semantics interprets the primitives of the computer language as actions on 
the (somewhat abstracted) internal state of the computing system (ibid: p. 194). An example 
of an intrinsic representation is the primitive ADD operation in digital computers. It is 
                                                
1 This claim raises some ontological quandaries about semantics being confined to some physical boundaries. 
To avoid a metaphysical debate, let me clarify. In conventional digital computers, computer programs are 
translated into machine language, which drives the operation of the computer at the hardware level. Take the 
following code example in assembly (a low-level programming language that works very close to the hardware 
level). 
__asm__ ( “movl $2, %eax;” 
    “movl $25, %ebx;” 
    “imull %ebx, %eax;”) 
This instruction tells the computer to multiply 2 and 25 and store the result into register %eax. The end result 
might represent, say, a total of 50 apples for a field trip of 25 children. But that makes no difference to the 
execution of the instruction above. The semantics of that instruction (i.e., moving data between registers, 
multiplying values, etc.) is contained within the boundaries of the computer. 
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described as a numerical opcode in the machine language, which is interpreted by the system 
as standing in for or representing the ADD operation itself. This may invite the challenge that 
an interpretation by the computing system implies that it has knowledge of that instruction. 
But this is hardly the case in human-engineered computing systems. A reply to this challenge 
requires a further distinction between know-how and know-that. Crudely put, the former is 
implicit knowledge, which is typically based on heuristics, whereas the latter is explicit and 
consists of propositional knowledge. Some have argued that know-how, such as how to ride a 
bike, how to play a piano, etc., “cannot be analyzed in terms of abilities, dispositions and so 
on; rather, there appears to be an irreducible cognitive element” (Chomsky 1992: p. 104, 
italics added). Or in other words, know-how requires know-that. 
Yet, others have argued that not all know-how consists of propositional knowledge. “[I]f, 
for any operation to be intelligently executed, a prior theoretical operation [of considering 
appropriate propositions] had first to be performed […], it would be a logical impossibility 
for anyone ever to break into the circle” (Ryle 1949: p. 31). Instead, know-how is construed 
as a skilled performance of an operation that is measured by it success, efficiency, etc. (ibid: 
p. 29). Still, some researchers have insisted that know-how always consists of propositional 
knowledge (Stanley and Williamson 2001). 
The plot thickens, but we need not go that far. To execute the primitive ADD operation, 
the CPU follows the opcode direction to the physical address of ADD. And the ADD 
operation itself is simply a hardwired mechanism2 that converts input bits to output bits using 
some combination of logic gates. Put another way, the ADD operation is coded by a unique 
                                                
2 If, for some technical reasons, this mechanism is replaced with a soft-wired mechanism (i.e., either through 
explicit how-to rules or a soft-constraint learning mechanism), the overall principle will still hold. Even in 
the case of the soft-constraint learning mechanism, it will eventually learn (say, by heuristics) how to 
perform effectively without knowing what it is doing. 
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binary pattern and whenever this particular sequence lands in the CPU’s instruction register, 
it is akin to a dialled telephone number that mechanically opens up the lines to the right 
special-purpose circuit (Dennett 1991: p. 214). The CPU’s “know-how” requires no “know-
that” of the ADD operation. 
On the other hand, extrinsic representations refer to symbols, data or objects that exist 
outside the physical boundaries of the computing system. Unlike their intrinsic counterparts, 
extrinsic representations are external-knower-dependent: a knower assigns external (or real-
world) semantics to data structures, strings or symbols. The contents of some data structures 
or computer programs may have external semantics relating to some states of affairs when the 
computing system directly interacts with the environment in which it is embedded. Still, the 
computer program will perform, say, the same database search operation (if prompted) just as 
well, even if the strings of symbols searched for were the names of planets (rather than, say, 
names of employees) and the corresponding numerals were their coordinates in the galaxy 
(rather than, say, salaries of employees)3. 
3 Computationalism  
3.1 A narrow construal – classicism, and symbolic computation 
The classicist thesis is that cognition is symbolic computation. Zenon Pylyshyn claims that 
the idea that “certain behavioural regularities can be attributed to different representations 
(some of which are called beliefs […]) and to symbol-manipulating processes operating over 
these representations” is fundamental to cognitive science (1999: p. 10). Similarly, John 
                                                
3 At the program level, any factual information entered by a user is converted into something recognisable by 
the computing system by using an implicit semantics dictionary. This dictionary is used to translate any 
factual information into some data structure that is recognisable by the program. The ace of hearts card, for 
instance, is translated into a data structure with properties such as a shape, a number, etc. This data structure 
can be processed by the program and when appropriate, the processed data can be translated back into some 
form of human readable information as output. 
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Haugeland claimed that “thinking and computing are radically the same” (1985: p. 2) and that 
“an intelligent system must contain some computational subsystems […] to carry out […] 
internal manipulations” (1985: p. 113, italics added). 
Let us pause briefly to consider two similar accounts of concrete computation that 
underpin the classicist view, according to which digital computation is interpreted as 
program–controlled symbol manipulation. The first one is the formal symbol manipulation 
(FSM, for short) account, which is nicely summarised by Jerry Fodor. “[Digital] computation 
is a causal chain of computer states and the links in the chain are operations on semantically 
interpreted formulas in a machine code” (Fodor 1981: p. 122). Fodor, Pylyshyn and 
Haugeland subscribe to the FSM account (though they diverge on some of the particulars). 
According to this account, a physical system performs digital computation when it processes 
semantically interpreted (not just interpretable) symbols (Pylyshyn 1984: pp. 62, 72). Digital 
computing systems manipulate symbol tokens, which are representations of the subject matter 
the computation is about, in accordance with some purely formal principles. 
The second relevant account of concrete computation in this context is the physical 
symbol systems (PSS, for short) account. Its main champions were Allen Newell and Herbert 
Simon. According to this account, digital computing systems just are (universal) physical 
symbol systems containing sets of interpretable and combinable entities (i.e., symbols) and a 
set of processes that operate on these entities by generating, copying, modifying, combining 
and destroying them according to instructions. These symbols are physical patterns (i.e., 
tokens) that can occur as components of symbol structures (Newell and Simon 1976: p. 116). 
The resemblance to the FSM account is clear. Newell and Simon argued that “[a] physical 
symbol system has the necessary and sufficient means for general intelligent action” (ibid). 
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Undoubtedly, classicists are committed to the idea that cognitive capacities are 
underpinned by mental representations. They insist that the combinatorial structure and 
compositionality of mental representations is critical for our cognitive capacities (Fodor and 
Pylyshyn 1988: pp. 17-18). Fodor claims that mental processes are operations defined on 
syntactically structured mental representations, much like sentences in natural language 
(1981). Pylyshyn adds that “[w]hat makes it possible for […] intelligent organisms to behave 
in a way that is correctly characterised in terms of what they represent (say, beliefs and goals) 
is that representations are encoded in a system of physically instantiated symbolic codes” 
(1999: p. 5, italics original). 
In short, classicism is a narrow conception of digital computationalism. It is committed to 
a symbolic model of cognition consisting of at least two levels. Physical symbol systems are 
describable at two levels: the symbol level and the physical level. Newell asserted that 
symbol structures and operators4 on these structures (at the symbol or program level) are 
realisable in physical mechanisms (1980: p. 156). Pylyshyn proposes a tripartite 
decomposition of cognitive systems (akin to David Marr’s tripartite analysis5). At the 
top/semantic level, knowledge and goals as well as certain behaviours of the cognitive system 
are attributed to different representations and the processes operating on them respectively. 
At the middle/symbol level, symbolic expressions encode the semantic content of the 
system’s knowledge and goals. At the bottom/physical level, representation-governed 
behaviour of the entire system is implemented by some biological substrate (Pylyshyn 1993, 
1999: pp. 7-11). 
                                                
4 Operators (such as ‘+’, ‘-‘, or ‘copy’) are symbols or symbolic expressions that have an external semantics 
built into them (Newell 1980: p. 159). 
5 The semantic level, for example, is sometimes equated with Marr’s top/computational level, but it should not 
be. Marr’s top level characterises the function computed by the cognitive system. This computation may (but 
need not) involve the assignment of semantic contents. 
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It is easy to see then why classicists invoke computation-theoretic language to explain 
cognition. In the light of the above, the great flexibility of program-controlled digital 
computers makes them ideal models of cognitive agents performing complex tasks in virtue 
of language-processing-like operations. By endorsing either the FSM or PSS accounts of 
computation, classicists can easily appeal to existing computational architectures and related 
tools to explain cognitive phenomena. Yet, they also insist on a too narrow class of digital 
computing systems and impose an extrinsic representational constraint on computation 
proper6.  
3.2 Broad construals of computationalism, and digital computation  
How broadly can we construe computationalism? The short answer is: it depends. The 
classical dichotomy of computation simpliciter is between digital and analogue computation. 
Even if we took computation to be just digital computation, we would still be left with many 
versions of digital computationalism depending on the particular account of computation that 
we endorsed. Broad digital computationalism is certainly more encompassing than 
classicism, which posits a narrow class of digital computing systems. A classicist, who 
subscribes to the FSM account, takes physical computing systems to be program-controlled 
digital computers. Her fellow classicist, who subscribes to the PSS account, takes physical 
computing systems to be programmable stored-program digital computers. 
Importantly, different accounts of digital computation entail different versions of broad 
digital computationalism. For example, according to the view endorsed by John Searle (1990) 
and Hilary Putnam (1988), every sufficiently complex physical system (trivially) performs 
digital computation. This view inevitably leads to strong digital pancomputationalism, for 
                                                
6 This imposed representational constraint is unsurprising, as the motivation of the classicists, who promote the 
FSM and PSS accounts, was advancing a substantive empirical hypothesis about how human cognition works.  
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rocks, chairs, paper clips, oranges, humans and the physical universe – all digitally compute. 
It is not only that every sufficiently complex physical system computes some Turing-
computable function (i.e., weak digital pancomputationalism), but rather that the system 
computes every Turing-computable function. This version of digital pancomputationalism is 
hardly illuminating. More precisely, it is an anti-realist version of pancomputationalism. It 
does not tell us that the universe has a particular structure, but it is rather invoked to argue 
against cognition being computational in any substantial sense (Dodig-Crnkovic and Müller 
2011: p. 154). It stems from the anti-realist view that it is merely our subjective description 
that makes a physical system computational.7 
However, we need not go so far as to promote digital pancomputationalism, to be able to 
endorse a digital computationalist thesis that is broader than classicism. Subscribing to some 
of the other extant accounts of concrete digital computation, which do not appeal to extrinsic 
representations, leads to a broader digital computationalist thesis. For example, according to 
the mechanistic account of computation, a physical system performs digital computation, if it 
manipulates input strings of digits8, depending on the digits’ type and their location in the 
string, in accordance with a rule defined over the strings (and possibly the system’s internal 
states) (Piccinini and Scarantino 2011: p. 8). 
The resulting digital computationalist thesis, which is based on the mechanistic account, is 
broader than the classicist thesis. On this account, digital computing systems are individuated 
by their functional properties that are specified mechanistically without invoking any 
                                                
7 Gordana Dodig-Crnkovic asserts that to make pancomputationalism a substantial thesis that plays a key role in 
a scientific theory about the universe, we should adopt a realist weak version of pancomputationalism (Dodig-
Crnkovic and Müller 2011: pp. 154-155). All processes can be described as computational processes, since such 
a description happens to be useful in a scientific theory. It is ‘weak’ in the sense that it focuses on ways of 
description, rather than on realist ontology. 
8 A digit, on this account, is a stable state of a component that is processed by the computing system. In ordinary 
electronic computers digits are states of physical components of the machine (e.g., memory cells). 
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extrinsic representations (Piccinini 2008a). Further, unlike the FSM and PSS accounts of 
computation, it is not restricted only to symbolic computation. Relevant digital computing 
systems, on the mechanistic account, range from special-purpose TMs and special-purpose 
computers through universal TMs, programmable stored-program systems, Gandy machines9 
and discrete neural networks to (the contentious) hypercomputers. Any one of these systems 
has its own pros and cons as an adequate model of cognition. Still, the point is that the 
resulting digital computationalist thesis is more encompassing than the classicist thesis. 
There are other accounts of computation that neither presuppose any extrinsic 
representational vehicles nor restrict the class of digital computation to the class of symbolic 
computation. Such accounts include the algorithm execution account and Robin Gandy’s 
account (of parallel computation). How ‘algorithm’ is interpreted affects the resulting 
algorithm execution account10. For the purposes of this paper, we adopt Jack Copeland’s 
account, according to which a physical system performs digital computation when it acts in 
accordance with an algorithm (1996). He defines an algorithm, Al, as a finite set of 
instructions such that, for some computing system, CS, each instruction of Al calls for one or 
more primitive operations of CS to be performed, either unconditionally or if specific 
conditions, recognisable by CS, are met (Copeland 1997: p. 696). 
Moreover, a key feature of his account alluding to representations is the “labelling 
scheme” requirement (ibid: p. 338). The labelling scheme of CS consists of two parts, the 
                                                
9 A Gandy machine is a deterministic discrete machine that can perform operations in parallel. It can be 
conceptualised as multiple TMs working in parallel, sharing the same tape and possibly writing on 
overlapping regions of it. 
10 It is worth noting that Robert Cummins, for instance, also holds the view that digital computation is the 
execution of algorithms (or programs), but his view does presuppose extrinsic representations. “[B]eing able 
to track computations under their semantic interpretations allows us to see how a physical engine – a 
computer – can satisfy epistemic constraints” (Cummins 1996: p. 66). But his account of computation proper 
is ultimately inadequate for other reasons as well. On his account, Searle’s wall also computes (Copeland 
1996: p. 353). 
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designation of certain parts of CS as label-bearers and the method for specifying the label 
borne by each label-bearing part at any given time. Yet, this designation is limited to intrinsic 
representations of numbers, functions and computing instructions. On this account, digital 
computation is not limited to symbolic computation, and it includes any system that acts in 
accordance with an algorithm, such as special- and general-purpose digital computers, TMs 
and finite state automata. Accordingly, the resulting digital computationalist thesis in this 
case is that cognition is algorithmic computation that need not be symbolic. 
Gandy’s account also gives rise to a broad digital computationalist thesis. According to 
this account, a physical system performs digital computation when it goes through a sequence 
of state transitions whose input is encoded as the system’s initial state, and each one of its 
states is its output at a given time (1980: p. 127). On this account, labels designate “the 
various parts of the machine – e.g., […] a transistor and its electrodes [… but also] positions 
in space (e.g., for squares of the tape of a Turing machine) and […] physical attributes (e.g., 
[…] the symbol on a square)” (ibid). Yet, this designation need not involve any extrinsic 
representation. Further, Gandy’s account encompasses parallel digital computation by 
violating Turing’s boundedness condition. The resulting computationalist digital thesis is 
broader than the classicist thesis, and it is prima facie more biologically plausible, given what 
neuroscience tells us about the parallel neural activity in the brain. 
Computationalism may be further extended beyond digital computationalism. If 
‘computation’ is taken as generic computation, then we get the broadest version of 
computationalism (that is not digital pancomputationalism). Generic computation includes 
digital computation, analogue computation, quantum computation and neural computation. It 
is characterised as the processing of medium-independent vehicles according to rules 
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allowing for the processing of continuous variables, strings of digits, or neuronal spike trains 
(Piccinini and Scarantino 2011: p. 10-13). Generic computationalism is the thesis that 
cognition is computation in a generic sense. It does not amount to pancomputationalism 
though. It is a plausible (but weak) explanatory framework and still falsifiable (e.g., if it 
turned out that cognitive capacities depended inherently on some particular physical 
properties). 
In sum, computationalism should not be identified with classicism. The latter is but one 
digital computationalist alternative positing a narrow class of digital computing systems as 
candidate models of cognition. How broadly computationalism should be construed depends 
on the particular account of computation invoked. Choosing the right account is no easy task. 
The discussion thus far still leaves out the analogue computationalism alternative, which is 
based on analogue computation. This alternative is less common in cognitive science and it is 
discussed in the next section. 
4 Connectionism and Sub-symbolic Computation 
The connectionist thesis is that cognition is sub-symbolic computation. Accordingly, 
cognition should be explained by neural network activity (in a more generic sense than the 
association between stimuli and responses). Modern connectionists argue that these neural 
networks11 perform sub-symbolic computation (Rumelhart and McClelland 1986; Smolensky 
                                                
11 Neural (or connectionist) networks consist of multiple interconnected homogenous units called ‘neurons’. 
These nets can be classified into two general categories: feedforward nets and feedback (or recurrent) nets. 
In the former case, units are arranged across multiple layers such that the output of units in one layer 
depends only on those in previous layers. The outputs of units are updated layer by layer with the first one 
being the input layer and the last one being the output layer. In the latter case, feedback loops in the network 
allow signals between units to travel in both directions (rather than just in a unidirectional forward manner). 
A source of controversy arises in regard to representations in connectionist nets. On the localist 
interpretation, each individual unit, which is active in a particular distributed activation pattern, realises an 
individual representation contributing to the overall content of the activation pattern. On the distributive 
interpretation, a representation is realised by either by an activation pattern or an activation pattern and its 
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1988; Smolensky and Legendre 2006; Chalmers 1992; MacLennan 2001). Under this 
interpretation, it is implicit that neural nets are capable of computations that are not limited to 
discrete manipulations of symbolic representations. In a sharp contrast to classicism, most 
connectionists reject the claim that a language of thought is required for an adequate 
explanation of cognition. This makes the tension between connectionism so construed and 
classicism obvious. Some have explicitly advanced the thesis that neural nets are analogue 
computers (Diederich 1990; O’Brien 1999; O’Brien and Opie 2006). Others have restricted 
the classification of neural nets as analogue computers to a certain kind of networks, 
primarily those that process real-valued quantities (Siegelmann 1999; Kremer 2007). 
Moreover, according to Gerard O’Brien and Jon Opie, connectionism is grounded in 
analogue computation, for neural nets “compute by exploiting relations of structural 
resemblance between their connection weights and their target domains” (2006: p. 41). On 
their view, “[a]nalog computers are systems whose behaviour is driven […] by semantically 
‘active’ analog representations that physically or structurally resemble what they represent” 
(ibid: p. 33). It follows, by their lights, that neural networks are analogue computers. The 
representational vehicle invoked in a connectionist analysis is based on a structural 
isomorphism between the network’s activation patterns and the task domain. This 
isomorphism renders the shape of the activation landscape semantically significant (ibid: pp. 
32-34; O’Brien 1999). 
If they are right, then connectionism is a variant of analogue computationalism, that is, the 
thesis that cognition is analogue computation. But, as already mentioned above, the notion of 
analogue computation is also equivocal. According to O’Brien and Opie, analogue 
                                                                                                                                                  
weighted connections. For further discussion on neural networks see, for example, John Tienson’s 
introduction (1988). 
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computation is defined over analog representations. When Hava Siegelmann invokes this 
notion, she refers to computation performed by a very specific type of recurrent neural 
networks, which perform operations on real variables and allow loops among some of the 
units (1999). Nevertheless, the most precise characterisation of analogue computation may be 
attributed to the Shannon-Pour-El Thesis. According to this thesis, the outputs of general-
purpose analogue computers correspond exactly to differentially algebraic functions. 
Therefore, there exists a universal analogue computer that using just a handful of integrators 
can compute (to some arbitrary degree of approximation) any possible continuous function 
(Rubel 1985: pp. 75-76). The main point is that analogue computation is a continuous change 
of real variables over time. 
Yet, there remain the questions whether analogue computation has to be defined over 
representations and whether connectionist networks are rightly classified as analogue 
computers. Analogue computers (and their processing units) have the function of 
transforming an input real variable into an output real variable, which stands in some specific 
functional relation to the input variable. Whilst their operations can also be understood in 
terms of analogue representations, they need not be (Piccinini 2008b: p. 48). I have argued 
elsewhere that connectionist computation is best classified as analogue computation without 
invoking any extrinsic representational properties (REMOVED_FOR_ANONYMITY 2010). 
However, this conclusion is too strong. There are certainly good reasons to classify discrete 
neural nets, which process binary-valued or integer-valued quantities, as digital computing 
systems (still without invoking any extrinsic representations). That would certainly be the 
case, if we adopted, say, the mechanistic account of concrete digital computation.  
Some connectionist networks perform digital computation, while others perform analogue 
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computation. The idea of discrete binary networks goes back to the seminal 1943 paper by 
Warren McCulloch and Walter Pitts. On their model, each neuron was modelled as a linear 
threshold element with a binary output. This was the first model of a discrete neural net 
exhibiting all-or-none firing patterns. When both the inputs and the outputs of such neural 
nets are binary the result is a Boolean circuit (Siu et al. 1995: pp. 1-2). Since the McCulloch 
and Pitts networks can be used to build digital computers, these (and similar discrete) neural 
networks are best classified as digital computing systems12. 
Incidentally, Daniel Dennett has pointed out that connectionist networks should not be 
regarded as a “shift to some ‘qualitatively different’ mode of operation. [For] at the heart of 
[the connectionist] system lies a von Neumann engine […] computing a computable 
function” (1991: p. 269). I do not know whether Dennett meant it literally (or just 
metaphorically). But if we analyse individual units of a discrete neural network as simple 
physical computing systems, strictly they need not have von Neumann architecture.  
For von Neumann architecture implies a general-purpose computing system, whereas 
individual units of the neural network are special-purposed. John von Neumann and 
colleagues argued that for the “device [to] be a general-purpose computing machine it should 
contain certain main organs relating to arithmetic, memory-storage, [and] control” (Burks et 
al 1946: p. 399). The arithmetic logic unit in the von Neumann architecture must be capable 
of the basic elementary operations of addition, subtraction, multiplication and division. But 
each individual neural unit only performs addition and multiplication of all the weighted 
connections leading to that particular unit. Besides, these units need not have any built in 
memory for storing multiple instructions and other data. But perhaps most importantly, a 
                                                
12 Otherwise, if McCulloch and Pitts networks were classified as analogue computing systems, then digital 
computers would be analogue too. 
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general-purpose computing system can be programmed to perform any function that some 
special-purpose computing system can perform. Yet, each neural unit is a special-purpose 
system, whose instruction is an integral part of that system and constitutes a part of its design 
structure. Each unit can be described as either an IF-THEN equivalent (if threshold exceeded, 
then “fire”) or a Boolean circuit (when its inputs and output are binary). 
Furthermore, we can distinguish between two types of neural nets based on their 
dynamics. According to the mechanistic account of computation, the first type of networks 
takes strings of digits as inputs and outputs, has discrete dynamics and does not change its 
structure over time. The second type of networks takes strings of digits as inputs and outputs, 
but has continuous dynamics or changes over time (Piccinini 2008c). Whilst only the first 
type belongs to the class of classical digital computing systems, both these types of neural 
nets perform digital computation on the mechanistic account of computation.  
Yet, there exists another class of neural nets, which process continuous real-valued 
quantities, that do not perform digital computation. These networks turn their input into their 
output in virtue of their continuous dynamics and do not compute by manipulating strings of 
digits (ibid: p. 319). Continuous variables are not strings of digits and this suffices to rule out 
these networks as digital computing systems in the sense of computation employed in 
computer science. Nevertheless, these neural nets can be correctly classified as analogue 
computers, for they satisfy the following five plausible criteria. First, the network’s 
operations take a continuous range of values over time. Second, its physical dynamics are 
governed by operations on real variables. Third, the functional relation between inputs and 
outputs of the net is best described by a set of differential equations. Four, the network’s 
inputs and outputs are distinguished from one another up to a limited degree of precision. 
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Lastly, the net may be subject to varying levels of noise (REMOVED_FOR_ANONYMITY 2010). 
Moreover, on other accounts of concrete digital computation, (discrete) neural nets do not 
straightforwardly qualify as performing digital computation. Unsurprisingly, on both the 
FSM and PSS accounts, connectionist networks do not compute, because they do not operate 
algorithmically on structured symbolic representations. This has been the source of much 
debate in the late 80’s and throughout the 90’s (for just the tip of the iceberg see, for example, 
Fodor and Pylyshyn 1988; Smolensky 1991, 1995; Clark 1990; Chalmers 1993; Matthews 
1997; Bechtel 2001). But interestingly, even on the algorithmic execution account above, it is 
not immediately clear that discrete neural networks compute, for it is not obvious whether 
they execute algorithms in the classical sense of computability theory. This may seem bizarre 
at first, since neural nets are typically simulated on digital computers. But that is not the 
point. The question is whether discrete neural nets perform digital computation not whether 
they can be simulated on digital computers.  
To answer this question one needs to judge (discrete) neural nets on their own merits as 
stand-alone non-simulated systems. When a neural net is implemented as a physical 
collection of interconnected simple processors (each one being an individual unit), it still 
needs to be trained to perform its designated task. The most common method of doing that is 
using the backpropagation learning procedure. Whilst this procedure can be described as 
an algorithm in the classical sense used in computer science, it still does not imply that 
connectionist computation is algorithmic. 
Once the system is trained and performs its task successfully, the question remains: 
does the network operate algorithmically? Connectionist networks do not operate by 
following the same type of “hard” predefined rules that are programmed on conventional 
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digital computing systems13. Their operation can rather be described as the satisfaction of 
soft-constraints, where each connection between two units represents a soft-constraint. 
Whether a unit actually fires or not depends on a simple summation function of all the 
weighted signals received by any particular unit. This activation is commonly known as a 
spreading activation algorithm, where it is distributed over the network, based on some 
mathematical function of the connections weights (Waltz and Pollack 1985: pp. 54-55). 
Granted that connectionist networks compute, connectionism is (at least) a subclass of 
generic computationalism. If discrete connectionist networks are sufficient for explaining 
cognition, then connectionism (does not just overlap with, but) is a subclass of digital 
computationalism14. If continuous neural nets are sufficient for explaining cognition, then 
connectionism is a subclass of analogue computationalism. However, if the full range of 
connectionist networks is required for explaining cognitive phenomena, then connectionism 
is a subclass of generic computationalism. At any rate, on the preceding analysis, none of 
these three options has to presuppose extrinsic representations for connectionist network 
computation. 
5 Computational Neuroscience, and Neural Computation 
Already in the 90’s, but particularly in the past decade, computational modeling of cognition 
has become an active area in neuroscience in an attempt to disclose how neurons give rise to 
cognitive functions. This research program now wears the title computational neuroscience 
                                                
13 By implementing soft constraints, connectionist networks arguably allow the task demands, rather than the 
designer's biases (like in rule-driven digital computing systems) to be primary driver shaping the operation 
of the network. To some extent, this approach reflects a shift in methodology when compared with Marr’s 
classical top-down approach (which is overtly endorsed by classicists). 
14 Still, this does not completely resolve the classicist main beef with connectionist networks, which do not 
process structured symbolic representations. Fodor and Pylyshyn think that cognition is syntactically 
governed manipulation of structured representations. Connectionism, so they conclude, is hopeless as a 
(competence) theory of cognition (REMOVED_FOR_ANONYMITY 2010). 
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and employs a broad range of techniques also using some tools from the domain of computer 
science. It is worth noting that computational neuroscience should not be identified with 
connectionism. The latter typically refers to models based on behavioural data, whereas the 
former refers to models based on both behavioural and neuroscientific data. Besides, the 
backpropagation method, which is typically used to train the system, depends on the units 
being able to relay signals bi-directionally. However, the dendrites and axons, which act as 
input and output channels to and from brain neurons typically allow nerve impulses to travel 
in one direction only. And whilst individual units in connectionist networks are homogenous, 
brain neurons are physiologically specialised. 
Furthermore, computational neuroscience downplays the explanatory role of the standard 
digital computer metaphor and connectionist networks in cognitive science. Computational 
cognitive science attempts a fairly close integration of psychological, neurophysiological and 
neurobiological data and theories of cognition (Boden 2008). Most existing connectionist 
networks are hugely different from the anatomy of the brain. The units of connectionist 
networks are computationally far too simple when compared with real neurons15, though 
some attempts have been made to model brain neurons more faithfully (cf. the discussion 
about models that do not impose the simplification or homogenisation of the computational 
units in Maass and Markram 2004). 
Moreover, Patricia Churchland and Terrence Sejnowsky argue that Marr’s tripartite 
computationalist analysis aligns poorly with the levels of organisation in the nervous system 
(1992: pp. 18-19). On Marr’s analysis, the top-level competence function can be examined 
independently of understanding the algorithm that is performed in the brain and similarly the 
                                                
15 Of course, some degree of simplification is needed to make any model viable, since models, by definition, 
abstract away from some of the particulars of the modelled system. The question here is whether 
connectionist networks simplify too much in the process of modelling cognition. 
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problem of discovering the algorithm at work is independent of its underlying physical 
realisation. This top down approach makes neurobiological facts about the nervous system 
less relevant, since they are just details at the implementation level. Later research in 
computational neuroscience suggested that knowledge of the brain architecture plays a vital 
role in understanding those “algorithms that have a reasonable shot at explaining how in fact 
neurons do the job” (ibid: p .19). 
Unlike digital computationalism, computational neuroscience studies cognition in a 
bottom-up approach, whilst still being informed by top-down theories. Research from 
neuropsychology, neuroethology and psychophysics provides the details about the relevant 
lower level mechanisms. But lower level research remains incomplete in the absence of top-
level analyses of the very cognitive capacity, whose mechanisms are studied at the lower 
level. Neuroscientific research can profit, for instance, from abstract discoveries in 
computability theories and discoveries in the construction of physical computing systems 
(ibid: pp. 11-12). Unlike other cognitive scientific research programs, neuroscience attempts 
to do more than “merely reproduc[e …] a function of the brain (such as playing chess)” 
whereas this may be sufficient in AI research (Eliasmith and Anderson 2003: p. 1). Yet, as 
the name suggests, computational neuroscience is committed to the view that the brain is an 
implemented computing system (Churchland et al. 1988; Churchland and Sejnowsky 1992; 
Dayan and Abbott 2001; Eliasmith and Anderson 2003; Trappenberg 2010). 
Nevertheless, computational neuroscience is not committed to cognition being either 
symbolic computation or sub-symbolic computation, for that matter. Neurons are taken to be 
computational units that process information to solve complex tasks, such as perception. But 
what neuroscientists take ‘computation’ or ‘neural computation’ to be is another matter 
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entirely. One approach is to agree that whilst there is no precise definition of the computation 
performed in the brain, it certainly is broader than the notion of digital computation. They 
take a physical computing system to be one whose physical states can be described as 
representing states of some (other) systems, where transitions between states are operations 
on representations (Churchland and Sejnowsky 1992: p. 61-62; Eliasmith 2003). More 
specifically, neural computation amounts to the encoding and decoding of neural spike trains 
(Eliasmith 2007: pp. 326-327). 
Arguably, neural computation so characterised may be a sui generis type of computation. 
This has been a recent thesis of some researchers, who argue that neuroscientific evidence 
shows that, on the one hand, typical neural signals (e.g., spike rates) are continuous, yet, on 
the other, these signals are constituted by spikes, which are discrete elements (Piccinini and 
Bahar 2011). Whilst this thesis is not uncontentious, it is compatible with some other 
characterisations of neural computation in neuroscience according to which neural 
computation is neither digital computation nor analogue computation (Churchland et al 1988: 
pp. 47-50; Eliasmith 2007: pp. 326-327; Poggio and Koch 1985). Others have proposed 
natural computation as an alternative notion of computation that is more suitable for 
describing the behaviour of biological systems (MacLennan 2004; Hamann and Wörn 
2007)16. The claim that neural computation (as it is invoked in computational neuroscience) is 
a sui generis type needs unpacking and I lack the space to discuss it further here. 
6 Extreme Dynamicism and the Non-Computational Shift  
Various “anti-representationalist” approaches are included under this heading starting with 
“radical” dynamicism (e.g., Thelen and Smith 1994; van Gelder and Port 1995) through 
                                                
16 For one thing, neural activity has many sources of noise making the underlying computation imprecise 
sometimes. This suggests that, unlike digital computation, natural computation itself is noisy and imprecise 
(MacLennan 2004: p. 129). 
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embodied and embedded dynamicism (e.g., Pfeiffer and Scheier 1999) to the enactivist 
approach (e.g., Varela et al. 1991; Thomson 2007). Whilst there are important differences 
amongst these approaches and grouping them together certainly does them an injustice by 
blurring those differences, they all share a similar trait. They all reject representation and 
computation as being key to understanding cognition.17 Instead, according to this new “post-
cognitivist” paradigm, cognition is not computational (Wallace et al. 2007: p. 26). This new 
paradigm distances itself from both computationalism and connectionism by broadening 
its research focus on the brain and including the body and its relationship to the “outside” 
world. The purpose of my exposition here is to reveal any misconceptions about computation 
and so specific details about the different approaches are omitted for brevity18. 
An underlying claim of the extreme dynamicist approaches is that cognition is not 
computational. Advocates of these approaches think that it is time for cognitive science to 
embrace a non-computational paradigm. In the early 90’s, Rodney Brooks designed the 
mobots, which were robots capable of functioning in a messy and unpredictable environment. 
He claimed that these robots “do not have traditional AI representations […] which have any 
semantics that can be attached to them” (Brooks 1991: p. 149)19. “Radical” dynamicists, Tim 
van Gelder and Robert Port argued that “[t]he cognitive system is not a discrete sequential 
manipulator of static representational structures” (1995: p. 3). Similarly, embodied 
dynamicists, Rolf Pfeiffer and Christian Scheier, criticised the “analogy between human 
                                                
17 The label ‘extreme dynamicism’ is used to alert the reader that in some sense, any cognitive scientist is by 
definition a dynamicist. For there seems to be a consensus that cognition is a dynamical phenomenon, and as 
such it requires some application of dynamical systems theory. So, for clarity, the label ‘extreme 
dynamicism’ is chosen to denote the anti-computationalist position. 
18 To be sure, these different approaches are logically autonomous. One can subscribe to any particular approach 
without necessarily subscribing to the others. For a nice discussion on the history and differences amongst 
those approaches see, for example, Evan Thomson (2007: pp. 3-15). 
19 More precisely, Brooks only rejects what I dubbed extrinsic representations for the computations performed 
by these mobots. “[T]here need be no explicit representation of either the world or the intentions of the 
system” (Brooks 1991: p. 149). 
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thinking and processes running in a computer, that is, information processing as the 
manipulation of symbols” (1999: p. 47). 
Researchers endorsing one (or more) of these approaches have rejected the cognitivist 
paradigm, which gives rise to some form of a “Cartesian theater” (Spivey 2007: p. 313) and 
relies on a metaphor of the “mind as a computer” (ibid: p. 29). Still, the common 
interpretation of a computer is as a serial digital system (ibid; Wallace et al. 2007: p. 10; 
Froese 2011: p. 118) that performs information processing on representations (Wallace et al. 
2007: p. 10; Thomson 2007: p. 186). For the extreme dynamicist, representation is not a 
mandatory concept for explaining cognitive phenomena, which are seen as the simultaneous, 
mutually influencing unfolding of complex temporal structures. The digital computationalist, 
on the other hand, supposedly explains cognitive phenomena as simple transformations of 
static representations (Thelen and Smith 1994: pp. 164-165; van Gelder 1998: pp. 621-622). 
It seems then that advocates of the various extreme dynamical approaches share a common 
(mis)conception of computation. This conception leads them to reject computational research 
programs in cognitive science. Rather than relying on computer science as the foundation for 
traditional cognitive science, they promote dynamical systems theory as the foundation for an 
alternative cognitive science. For dynamical systems theory provides a general mathematical 
theory (which supposedly is already the standard language of the natural sciences) and it 
allows us to do better justice than computability theory to the continuous temporal changes of 
cognitive phenomena at multiple timescales (Froese 2011). 
Moreover, extreme dynamicists take computation to be a serially digital process that is 
carried out over extrinsic representations. Yet, Gandy machines, cellular automata and 
(discrete) connectionist networks, perform parallel digital computation and violate this 
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narrow characterisation. As well, computational neuroscience invokes the notion of neural 
computation that is (possibly) different than digital computation proper. Further, the assertion 
that digital computation is carried out over extrinsic representation is unsupported. Symbolic 
computation is merely a narrow class of digital computation. So, the dynamicist rejection of 
“information-processing on representations” as the basis of an adequate model of cognition 
only applies to models that are based on, say, the FSM and PSS accounts. However, broad 
digital computationalism is not susceptible to a similar criticism. 
Extreme dynamicism is advanced as a non-computational more biologically plausible 
framework. Nevertheless, it is not obvious why this is the case, as extreme dynamicists tend 
to ignore the practical details of the underlying mechanisms of the cognitive systems in 
question. That brings us to the next section. 
7 Mechanistic vs. Non-Mechanistic Explanatory Frameworks 
Before turning to evaluate whether dynamicism, connectionism and digital computationalism 
should be viewed as competing or complementary frameworks, let us briefly examine the 
main aspects of mechanistic explanations. Mechanisms typically have four characteristics: 
phenomenal, componential, causal and organisational. First, they are phenomenal in the sense 
that they perform tasks.20 The phenomenon is explained by appealing to the tasks performed 
as a whole and it partially determines the boundaries of the mechanism. Second, all 
mechanisms have at least two components. The components of a mechanism are those that 
are relevant to the explanandum. Third, these components are causally interrelated, that is, 
they interact with one another. Four, the spatial organisation of the components (in terms of 
their locations, shapes, orientations, etc.) as well as their temporal organisation (in terms of 
                                                
20 I follow Carl Craver and William Bechtel in labelling this characteristic ‘phenomenal’ in a manner unrelated 
to phenomenology (2006: p. 469). 
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the order, rates, and durations of the activities in the mechanism) play a key role in generating 
the phenomenon (Craver and Bechtel 2006: pp. 469-470). 
Moreover, a mechanistic explanation requires isolating some aspect of the phenomenon to 
be explained and positing a mechanism that is capable of producing this phenomenon. A 
mechanistic explanation of a system is achieved by virtue of identifying the relevant 
subcomponents of the mechanism and the corresponding activities (i.e., localisation) that are 
organised in the right way so as to produce the phenomenon in question. The localisation of 
the relevant components and corresponding activities is accomplished by means of structural 
and functional decomposition respectively. A structural decomposition begins by breaking 
the mechanism apart into subcomponents and then investigating what they do. A functional 
decomposition is accomplished by analysing the phenomenon into activities that, when 
properly organised, exhibit the phenomenon. For example, the chemical process of 
fermentation may be decomposed into a set of more basic chemical reactions, including 
oxidation and phosphorylation (ibid: p. 473).  
In the context of mechanistic explanations a distinction is typically made between 
mechanistic sketches (or mechanistic schemata) and complete mechanistic models. A 
mechanistic sketch (or scheme) is a functional analysis in which some structural details of a 
mechanistic explanation are excluded. But once the omitted details are filled in, the 
functional analysis becomes a full-blown mechanistic explanation. A complete mechanistic 
model identifies the functional properties of the components and must respect constraints 
imposed by those components. It also does not leave any crucial gaps regarding how the 
mechanism works (Piccinini and Craver 2011). With this brief exposition in mind, let us 
return to examine the relation among dynamicism, connectionism and digital 
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computationalism as explanatory frameworks. 
Recently, some devoted dynamicists have argued that (good) dynamical accounts of 
cognitive phenomena are genuinely explanatory and not merely descriptive (Stepp et al. 
2011). This defence was invoked in response to the contemporary mechanistic philosophy of 
science that allegedly excludes dynamicists’ explanations of cognition (Machamer 2004; 
Bechtel 2009; Piccinini and Craver 2011). According to the defenders, the reason for this 
exclusion results from either a theoretical commitment to computational explanations or a 
normative commitment to a mechanistic philosophy of science. Instead of proposing a 
complete mechanistic explanation, dynamical explanations seek to model cognitive 
phenomena by identifying higher-level laws (or law-like principles). Dynamical explanations 
capture the temporal change of the phenomenon in question by a set of differential equations 
(Stepp et al. 2011: p. 432). 
Other authors have argued that some dynamical explanations are mechanistic. Arguably 
the fact that dynamical explanations use mathematical tools and concepts of dynamical 
systems theory does not entail that these explanations are non-mechanistic. On this view, 
(extreme) dynamicism can also sometimes be used to describe cognitive mechanisms. Carlos 
Zednik offers two examples that supposedly show that dynamical models and dynamical 
analyses are in themselves mechanistic throughout (2011). The first one is the infant 
perseverative reaching model by Esther Thelen and colleagues based on Jean Piaget’s classic 
A-not-B task. What Zednik identifies as most significant for his claim is a tripartite analysis 
of an input vector, which partakes in this dynamical explanation, into a task input, a trial-
specific input and a memory trace, which captures the influence of prior trials. The individual 
contributions of the task input, trial-specific input and memory trace can be supposedly 
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construed as the posited component operations of a mechanism for goal-directed reaching. 
Expressed as variables, these operations are linked in a dynamical equation that captures their 
role in this mechanism (ibid: pp. 248-249). 
The second example is Randall Beer’s dynamical explanation of perceptual categorisation 
in a simulated brain-body-environment system. The simulated system consists of a single 
minimally cognitive agent, which is equipped with a 14-neuron continuous-time recurrent 
connectionist network “brain”. The system is situated in a simple two-dimensional 
environment, which features a single circular or diamond-shaped object. This object falls 
vertically toward the agent in the course of the trial, and the agent responds by moving 
horizontally to catch circles and avoid diamonds, thereby performing a categorical 
discrimination. By Zednik’s lights, Beer’s dynamical explanation features a dynamical 
analysis that describes the activity of two components, the embodied “brain” and the 
environment (ibid: pp. 250-252). 
Nevertheless, these two examples do not show that extreme dynamicism offers a 
mechanistic explanation. They rather show that it is compatible with mechanistic cognitive 
models. Zednik argues that Beer’s dynamical analysis relies on the mechanistic heuristic of 
structural decomposition to identify two components, the embodied brain and the 
environment. The operations associated with each of the components are described by a 
detailed dynamical analysis. By doing so, Zednik puts a foot on a slippery slope. For once we 
allow such simple structural decomposition, any dynamicist explanation, which describes the 
interaction between a cognitive agent and the environment, is supposedly mechanistic. Beer’s 
model is mechanistic, but only because it includes a connectionist network, which models a 
part of the brain. His dynamical analysis complements the connectionist network model. 
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The infant perservative reaching model also does not support the claim that some 
dynamical models are mechanistic proper. Zednik implies that this model can be considered a 
relatively abstract mechanistic sketch, which leaves more than enough room for elaborating 
the possible neuroanatomical components giving rise to the goal-directed reaching 
phenomenon. At best, this model offers a functional decomposition of low-level processes of 
perception and action (ibid: pp. 249-250). Even if it were classified as an “abstract 
mechanistic sketch”, it would be at the “very incomplete” end of the spectrum. For, it lacks 
any structural decomposition of the underlying relevant components. Absent the 
identification of the participating components, any possible causal relations among them 
cannot be specified. As an incomplete mechanistic sketch, this model indeed invites a future 
development of a mechanistic explanation. Yet, there remains a big gap to be filled, as the 
model has to identify the causal structure of the system in question (Piccinini and Craver 
2011: p. 292). 
A dynamical explanation should not be misconceived as an alternative to mechanistic 
explanations. The Hodgkin-Huxley model of spike generation is arguably a good example of 
a genuine explanation. Still, it simultaneously offers a dynamical description (comprising a 
set of coupled differential equations to describe the dynamics of the membrane action 
potential) and a mechanistic one (describing how ion channels and related activities are 
organised to generate action potentials). These differential equations helped guide the search 
for the underlying components of the responsible mechanism (Kaplan and Bechtel 2011: p. 
439).  
It is the non-mechanistic dynamical approach that offers a genuinely different kind of 
cognitive science. Such an approach is not on a par with either connectionism or digital 
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computationalism. But whether this approach is truly explanatory or merely descriptive 
remains contentious. The burden of proof is on the extreme dynamicist to show how her 
approach is explanatory in the absence of a mechanistic description. Predictions based on 
law-like regularities are at best incomplete explanations. 
Whilst digital computationalism and connectionism also make available physical models 
of cognitive architectures, dynamicism proper offers a mathematical formalism describing the 
evolution of complex physical systems over time. Classicism and connectionism, for 
instance, may be competing for the same prize. But not dynamicism, as it provides a 
completely different type of epistemological analysis with a different purpose than the 
modelling one served by the other two. Whether cognition turns out to be a programmable 
digital computing system, a continuous recurrent network, both or neither, has no critical 
implications for dynamicism. If we endorse the view defended by Zednik, then some 
dynamical analyses may be considered incomplete mechanistic sketches. Still, as incomplete 
sketches they have to be elaborated by means of structural decomposition. Typically, 
dynamical analyses are complemented by connectionist networks in an attempt to identify the 
relevant subcomponents generating the cognitive phenomenon. 
Nevertheless, dynamicism proper is a non-mechanistic explanatory framework. It explains 
cognitive phenomena in one of three ways: metaphorically, using a small number of variables 
or using connectionist models (Thagard 2005: pp. 200-203). When not all influencing 
variables can be identified and the equations cannot be spelled out, dynamicists describe 
cognition metaphorically. But a metaphor only goes so far as an explanation. In other cases, 
where a small number of variables can be identified, dynamicism provides a mathematical 
description of the overall system state and its predicted changes under certain conditions. 
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When connectionist networks are employed, dynamicism offers a mathematical framework 
for analysing the workings of these networks (revealing the overlap between dynamicism and 
connectionism).  
“Radical” dynamicism, in particular, rejects the need to identify the various parts 
comprising the overall cognitive system and their organisation in a manner that contributes to 
the overall system activity. It thereby violates the decomposition principle (Bechtel 1998a, 
1998b). “Radical” dynamicists seek to identify the laws governing the “highest level relevant 
to an explanation of cognitive performances, whatever that may be” (van Gelder 1998: p. 
619). 
By contrast, connectionism and digital computationalism provide a mechanistic 
explanation of cognition. Models of cognitive architecture are available within each of these 
paradigms (yet, classicists downplay the importance of the particular physical 
implementation). There is certainly little reason to insist on a narrow view of 
computationalism as the basis for computational cognitive science21. But if we adopt a broad 
view of digital computationalism (say, one that follows from either the algorithmic execution 
account or the mechanistic account of computation) instead, then the result is a mechanistic 
explanation of cognition. 
Some authors have recently rejected the view that digital computationalism and 
connectionism are mechanistic cognitive models. For instance, Daniel Weiskopf argues that 
though they have some features in common with mechanistic models proper, they crucially 
differ in the manner in which they relate to the modelled cognitive system (2011: p. 314). By 
his lights, cognitive models are causally structured, componentially organised, and 
                                                
21 Cf. Hubert Dreyfus (1972), Searle (1980) and Steven Horst (1999) to name just a few critics of classicism. 
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semantically interpretable. Such cognitive models can be specified at different levels of 
analysis in a similar manner to full-blown mechanistic models (ibid: p. 327). However, the 
objection continues, cognitive models need not be mechanistic to be genuinely explanatory. 
For there need not always be a one-to-one correspondence of every component of the 
cognitive model to some real entity in the modelled system.  
Whilst some cognitive models may be genuinely explanatory, if a one-to-one 
correspondence does not obtain, then, by the mechanistic standards, they are supposedly 
inadequate. In some cognitive models, which offer functional layered analyses, what matters 
is that there is some stable pattern of organisation in the brain that carries out the appropriate 
processes assigned to each layer of analysis, and has the appropriate sort of causal 
organisation. For example, there could be a correspondence to a whole set of resources 
possessed by neural regions, rather than, say, individual neurons.22 Yet, if a simple 
correspondence among components of the cognitive model and some neural entities in the 
brain does not obtain, then the model is at best incomplete, and at worst false (ibid: pp. 329-
330).  
The gist of the objection is that whilst digital computationalist and connectionist models 
are both componential and causal, they need not necessarily be mechanistic. For these 
models often posit elements that do not straightforwardly map onto localised parts of the 
modelled cognitive system (ibid: p. 332). However, as Weiskopf acknowledges himself, this 
objection may be countered by distinguishing between mechanistic sketches and complete 
                                                
22 Weiskopf cites some researchers corroborating this claim. For example: 
“[P]sychological primitives are functional abstractions for brain networks that contribute to the formation of 
neuronal assemblies that make up each brain state” (Lisa Barrett, as cited by Weiskopf 2011: p. 330). 
“Almost every cognitive task involves the activation of a network of brain regions (say, 4-10 per 
hemisphere) rather than a single area” (Marcel Just et al, as cited by Weiskopf 2011: p. 330). 
 35 
mechanistic models. 
Connectionism typically offers cognitive explanations in terms of neural networks that 
need not correspond to networks of real brain neurons and synapses. A single artificial neural 
unit may correspond to a single region in the brain instead. Connectionist networks 
implement a task analysis without necessarily decomposing their overall operation into 
intelligible subtasks performed by individual components (i.e., units), which correspond to 
either individual brain neurons or regions. Connectionist modellers typically build their 
network as mechanistic models, yet they cannot give a complete mechanistic analysis of the 
microfeatures and microactivities that result from its adaptive weight changes during learning 
(Bechtel and Abrahamsen: p. 268).  
Moreover, connectionist networks explain cognitive phenomena without employing 
localisation and decomposition. The overall performance of the network is typically not 
decomposable into intelligible subtasks. Instead, such networks emaphasise dynamic 
behaviour that corresponds to the cognitive activity to be explained without the 
subcomponents of the system performing recognisable subtasks of the overall task. Each one 
of these subtasks is distributed across the layers of network and cannot be straightforwardly 
localised in any individual unit. In the absence of explicit rules connectionist networks have 
structures that are found in the networks’ connections (Bechtel and Richardson 2010: pp. 
217, 222-223). Yet, these networks are, at the very least, mechanistic sketches. 
Why are digital computationalist models mechanistic? In digital computationalist models, 
functional decomposition is accomplished by modelling the target cognitive phenomenon 
through a series of algorithmic operations. In principle, it is easier in (non-connectionist) 
computational models to localise individual operations in corresponding components, due 
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to the nature of these models. Conventional digital computing systems are typically driven by 
an explicit set of rules (cf. the mechanistic account or the algorithm execution account and 
even the FSM and PSS accounts). Data (or symbols, on the classicist view) are manipulated 
by either hard- or soft-programmed instructions. For the purposes of classifying digital 
computationalist models as mechanistic, these instructions that manipulate data (or symbols) 
embody an attempt to account for the performance of the modelled cognitive system by way 
of decomposing the overall task into simpler subtasks. 
Consider, for example, Marr’s model of vision and John Anderson’s ACT* production 
model. At the computational level, Marr’s analysis specifies what is being computed and 
why. At the algorithmic level, the visual system is specified by means of the representations 
being used as well as the algorithm for transforming inputs to outputs. This level provides an 
explanation of the structure of visual processes. The implementation level specifies the 
physical realisation of the representations and algorithm (Marr 1982). Marr’s tripartite 
model attempted to identify individual operations with specific neuroanatomical structures23 
(i.e., localising the detection of zero-crossings in cortical simple cells). Anderson’s ACT* 
production model analyses cognitive memory function while also providing a cognitive 
architecture. This model consists of three components: working memory, declarative (or 
explicit) memory and production (or implicit) memory. This model exhibits the performance 
of an action as loop of encoding (into working memory), match (against a rule in production 
memory) and execution (in working memory) (Anderson 1983). 
These computationalist models assume that the modelled mental activity is decomposable 
                                                
23 Piccinini and Craver argue that Marr’s three levels are not levels of mechanism, since they do not describe 
relations among components or subcomponents (2011: p. 303). On their interpretation, the computational and 
algorithmic levels are mechanistic sketches. The computational level describes the mechanism’s task and the 
algorithmic level describes the computational vehicles as well as the processes that manipulate these vehicles. 
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into a set of operations, each of which is governed by a set of instructions operating on 
representations (Bechtel and Richardson 2010: pp. 211-212). If a computationalist model also 
specifies how the relevant components are realised by neuroanatomical structures, then, by 
the standards of mechanistic explanation, it is a complete mechanistic model. Yet, such a 
direct localisation is not always practical. 
Not all advocates of dynamicism share the view of it being an alternative to 
connectionism and computationalism broadly (hence the label ‘extreme dynamicism’ is used 
above to denote a narrower subclass of dynamicism). Beer, for one, denies the extreme 
dynamicist thesis that cognitive systems are best understood only using the tools of 
dynamical systems theory (forthcoming). He asserts that there is no useful mathematical 
distinction to be drawn among dynamicism, connectionism and (digital) computationalism. 
For, on the one hand, all dynamical systems can be approximated by TMs and, on the other, 
TMs defined over the real numbers are equivalent to dynamical systems. Similarly, recurrent 
neural nets can approximate arbitrary dynamical systems. He also acknowledges that it is 
probable that connectionism, (digital) computationalism and dynamicism will all be 
important in any future theory of cognition.  
Yet, any mathematical distinctions aside, the mechanistic challenge remains unanswered. 
Connectionism and digital computationalism also make available models of cognitive 
architecture besides the mathematical toolbox that comes with the theory, but dynamicism 
proper does not. Digital computationalism need not be limited only to a specific formalism of 
computability, such as TMs or the lambda calculus. Formalisms of computability provide the 
mathematical tools required for determining the plausibility of computational level theories. 
Still, any particular formalism does not specify the relationship between abstract and 
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concrete computation. An algorithm formally specifies the relations between inputs and 
outputs and it can run on digital computers of various architectures. Any (classical) algorithm 
can (in principle) be executed on some TM. However, a TM is merely an idealisation and 
does not specify the physical mechanism(s) by which the algorithm is executed. 
Moreover, it is at the physical level that the algorithm is converted to a program and bound 
by the implementing physical system. An algorithm can, in principle, produce all the natural 
numbers by iteratively invoking the successor function starting from 0. However, a program 
that implements that algorithm will eventually fail when it runs out of physical memory. TMs 
may help us determine whether an algorithm can be implemented on a digital computing 
system. But it is at the level of the physical implementation that the actual operations are 
analysed in consideration of the physical architecture and the primitive operations supported 
as well as the “real time” speed of the executed program (as opposed to the number of 
discrete steps in a TM). And if cognition is an embodied biological phenomenon (as granted 
by the dynamicist), it is concrete computation that plays a key role in explaining cognition 
and not just computability theory. 
As observed above, dynamicism and mechanistic computational explanations are 
complementary. Understanding a particular mechanism but not its role in the overall 
dynamics of the cognitive agent (and perhaps the environment) is insufficient. Identifying a 
clock mechanism, for instance, in a physical computing system without discovering how it 
affects and is affected by the overall operation of the system only provides a partial 
explanation. And conversely, understanding the dynamics of the cognitive agents without 
identifying their constituent components provides a limited explanation at best. 
This complementarity principle has yielded some collaborative effort in computational 
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neuroscience where an understanding of single neurons is supplemented by dynamicism. For 
instance, Eugene Izhikevich has applied dynamical systems theory tools in studying the 
relationship among electrophysiology, bifurcations and computational properties of neurons 
(2007). Chris Eliasmith and Charles Anderson have introduced a framework for the study of 
cognition in which computation, representation and dynamical systems theory all play a role 
(2003). They argue that modern control theory is better suited than computability theory for 
understanding cognition as a biological system. According to their theory, neural 
computation is the transformation of neural representations. 
It certainly seems plausible that cognitive science has much to gain by adopting a broad 
perspective, which sees the above paradigms as complementary. A bottom up strategy alone 
will face significant challenges trying to explain how low level mechanisms give rise to high-
level cognitive phenomena. A purely top down strategy may yield a viable story that explains 
certain phenomena without establishing how they are grounded in the human biological 
substrate. But such a story is difficult to conclusively refute. Still, cognitive science that 
draws on each of these strategies simultaneously is more likely to overcome those challenges. 
Time will tell.    
8 Conclusion 
Cognitive science faces the nontrivial task of explaining cognition. Even setting aside the 
question of what consciousness is or how it fits in the whole story, human cognition remains 
largely unexplained. As soon as it seemed that computation might help us in explaining 
cognition, computation became foundational to the scientific enquiry. But when we are not 
even clear on what computation is precisely matters only get worse. Sections 3-5 illustrate 
how three research programs in cognitive science invoke computation differently for 
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explaining cognition. Section 6 illustrates how a particular construal of computation leads 
another research program to dismiss it as playing a key role in cognitive science. 
I have argued for enhanced clarity on how computation is invoked for explaining 
cognition. A blanket dismissal of the key role computation plays in cognitive science is 
unwarranted. Even if classicism, for example, were found untenable, digital 
computationalism could still survive. Moreover, by invoking computation as the basis for 
their explanatory frameworks, digital computationalism and connectionism gain not only 
(possible) competence level theories capitalising on mathematical formalisms, but potentially 
also physical cognitive architectures (or performance level theories). Dynamicism has to be 
complemented to provide a (complete) mechanistic explanation (see section 7 above). 
Computation is a general notion that offers great flexibility and its lure for explaining 
cognition is obvious. However, it comes at the cost of equivocation. When one makes 
assertions about cognition being computational (or not), one should also explicate what 
particular notion of computation is employed. 
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